Dispatchable Portfolio Standards Act

Groups have pressured electric utilities to adopt greenhouse gas reduction targets, such as net-zero by 2050. These targets are unrealistic, and they require utilities to drastically cut their use of fossil fuels, which are main sources of dispatchable power. These cuts and the failure to build new dispatchable power harm the state by preventing it from meeting its growing energy needs. This model law will help the state increase generating capacity to meet increasing demand and to protect the reliability of its electricity grid by requiring each utility to maintain a minimum percentage of dispatchable power, which is consistent with an all-of-the-above approach.

Summary: AN ACT relating to public utilities and dispatchable power.

SECTION 1. Legislative Findings

The State of [state name] makes the following findings.

  1. Public utilities have arbitrarily set emissions targets, and in some cases did not even consult with the relevant state officials before doing so1. They have also joined groups such as the “United Nations’ 24/7 Carbon-Free Energy Compact,”2 which includes the “key principle[]” of “driv[ing] the rapid decarbonization of electricity systems.”3
  2. Utilities have started retiring dispatchable and reliable generation sources such as coal and natural gas plants and have failed to plan for new dispatchable sources, instead sharply shifting to wind and solar.4 The result of these arbitrary policies is not a balanced strategy to develop all types of generating capacity but rather actions that are heavily skewed—with wind and solar comprising “close to 90% of all new builds and expansions in the first nine months of 2024,” up from 57% for the same period in 2023.5
  3. Retirements and failures to build new dispatchable generating capacity will hurt the state’s growth and ability to meet exploding demand. Overall demand for the U.S. electricity grid is expected to increase significantly, with “peak U.S. electricity demand increasing 14% by 2030 and 54% by 2050.”6
  4. The U.S. Department of Energy released a report in July 2025 that projected that “[r]etirements plus load growth increase risk of power outages by 100x in 2030.”7 The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) 2024 Reliability Assessment concludes that “most of the North American [bulk power system (BPS)] faces mounting resource adequacy challenges over the next 10 years as surging demand growth continues and thermal generators announce plans for retirement. … [T]he performance of these replacement resources is more variable and weather dependent than the generators they are replacing. As a result, less overall capacity (dispatchable capacity in particular) is being added to the system than what was projected and needed to meet future demand. The trends point to critical reliability challenges facing the industry…”8
  5. NERC’s 2024 reliability assessment characterizes MISO as “High Risk” and PJM, SPP, and ERCOT all as “Elevated Risk.” High risk means “shortfalls may occur at normal peak conditions.”9 “Elevated Risk” means shortfalls may occur in extreme conditions. NERC’s number one recommendation is to “carefully manage generator deactivations.”
  6. An additional problem is that utilities’ targets cause manufacturers to stop producing key components such as gas turbines. The president of Siemens Energy North America stated, “Gas turbines were dead in 2022.”10 This has led to long lead times in obtaining these critical components.
  7. The current breakdown of electricity source by fuel type per the U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) as of February 2024 is that approximately 86% of electricity generation was from a dispatchable source and approximately 14% was non-dispatchable (wind and solar).11 In addition, as of 2022, MISO and PJM both had over 70% of their total generation by fuel type as dispatchable, and SPP has approximately 60% of their total generation dispatchable.12
  8. However, if utilities follow the International Energy Association Agency Net Zero Roadmap, those percentages will shift dramatically, and fossil fuel will be reduced from 61% to 0% by 2050 and non-dispatchable renewables (wind and solar) will increase from 11% to 72%.13
  9. Spain and Portugal suffered an unexpected blackout in April 2025. At the time of their blackout, solar power accounted for approximately 60% of their energy mix.14 This blackout shows the risks of depending so heavily on non-dispatchable power.15

SECTION 2. Definitions

As used in this Act, the following terms are defined as follows:

  1. “Covered electric utility” means a public utility, including its affiliates, that owns or operates one or more electricity generation facilities, serves more than 1,000 customers in this state, and is subject to the jurisdiction of the [Public Utility Commission]. “Covered electric utility” includes an entity that seeks an authorization from the [Public Utility Commission] that, if granted, would result in it meeting the definition of a covered electric utility.
  2. Dispatchable power” means electric power from sources other than intermittent generation, including steam turbines, combustion turbines, and combined cycles driven by the combustion of coal or natural gas, nuclear fission, or geothermal energy. “Dispatchable power” does not include electric power from batteries or other storage mechanisms that are charged in whole or in part by intermittent generation.
  3. “Fuel mix” means the portfolio of energy sources, including natural gas, coal, nuclear, hydroelectric, geothermal, wind, and solar, that is used by the utility or third parties to generate energy over a given time period.
  4. “Intermittent generation” means electric generation that uses intermittent sources of energy that primarily rely on weather conditions, such as sunlight or wind.

Section 3. Minimum Dispatchable Portfolio

  1. It is the public policy of this state that each covered electric utility shall use a fuel mix that results in at least 70% of the total energy it delivers to its customers each month coming from dispatchable power.
  2. If a covered electric utility is unable to establish, based on objective and reliable evidence, both that that it has complied with Subsection A of this Section for each of the last twelve months and that it is projected to comply with Subsection A of this Section for each of the next sixty months, then
    1. the [Public Utility Commission] shall not approve the retirement or replacement, in whole or in part, of any generation asset for that utility that produces dispatchable power with a generation asset that uses intermittent generation; and
    2. the [Public Utility Commission] also shall not approve the construction of, or cost recovery for, any new generation asset for that utility that uses intermittent generation.
  3. The [Public Utility Commission] may approve an exception to the twelve-month backward-looking requirement in Subsection B of this Section if a utility establishes by clear and convincing evidence that it was not distributing electricity to customers in this state during some or all of that period or that its fuel mix fell below the policy in Subsection A due to events outside of its control. The [Public Utility Commission] may not approve any exception to the sixty-month forward looking requirement.
  4. The [Attorney General] and any affected person may, without having to exhaust any administrative remedies, bring an action to obtain a declaration that any action of a utility or the [Public Utility Commission] does not comply with this Section and to seek other appropriate relief including injunctive relief, costs, and attorneys’ fees. A customer of a utility qualifies as an affected person for purposes of this Subsection.

Section 4. Effective Date

Section 5. Severability

1 See recent statement by AEP President that acknowledged his company’s targets were “arbitrarily set without discussions with the states.” https://archive.is/OAo2h
2 https://www.seforall.org/press-releases/energy-leaders-launch-247-carbon-free-energy-compact
3 For example, U.S. utilities AES, Constellation Energy, and Xcel Energy have joined this group. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2021/10/24-7cfe_compact_-_v2_updated.pdf; https://gocarbonfree247.com/our-signatories/; https://stories.xcelenergy.com/stories/Xcel-Energy-joins-United-Nations—24-7-Carbon-Free-Energy-Compact
4 AEP “ha[s] retired, converted to natural gas or sold approximately 14,000 megawatts (MW) of coal-fueled generation.” https://docs.aep.com/docs/sustainability/2025-AEP-Sustainability-Report.pdf, at 44. Its 2024 plan listed “planned retirement and disposition of select fossil fuel units” as the first step of its “pathway to net-zero.” https://web.archive.org/web/20240506041751/https://aepsustainability.com/lib/docs/2024-AEP-Sustainability-Report.pdf at 22.
5 https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-industry-outlook.html
6 https://www.utilitydive.com/news/icf-sees-25-load-growth-by-2030-up-to-40-price-increase/748711/
7 https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/DOE%20Final%20EO%20Report%20%28FINAL%20JULY%207%29_0.pdf
8 Page 6, https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_Long%20Term%20Reliability%20Assessment_2024.pdf
9 Id. at 8.
10 https://www.power-eng.com/gas/turbines/long-lead-times-are-dooming-some-proposed-gas-plant-projects/
11 https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3. Fossil fuels represent 60%, nuclear represents 18.6%, dispatchable renewables represent approximately 7.2%, and non-dispatchable renewables represent approximately 14.1%.
12 Page 9, https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/2023_Common_Metrics_Report.pdf
13 https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/8ad619b9-17aa-473d-8a2f-4b90846f5c19/NetZeroRoadmap_AGlobalPathwaytoKeepthe1.5CGoalinReach-2023Update.pdf (Table A.3)
14 https://archive.is/zTeKA
15 See Power Magazine: “The April 2025 Iberian Peninsula blackout demonstrates the complexity of modern power systems, especially those with high renewable penetration.” https://www.powermag.com/understanding-the-april-2025-iberian-peninsula-blackout-early-analysis-and-lessons-learned/