China could invade Taiwan or take other hostile actions that would seriously disrupt energy supply chains that are dependent on China. Likewise, China’s use of forced labor poses a threat to the same supply chains. Solar panels made in China also recently were discovered to have rogue communication devices allowing components of those panels to be remotely disabled.
To prevent this risk to the State’s energy infrastructure, this bill would require applicants before state and local boards to demonstrate that the key parts of the State’s energy infrastructure do not rely on a supply chain that includes China.
Summary: AN ACT relating to protecting the integrity of this state’s energy infrastructure by requiring applicants seeking approval for energy infrastructure projects before state and local government boards to provide information showing the supply chain for such projects does not depend on an entity that is identified on certain federal lists.
SECTION 1. Legislative Findings
The State of [state name] finds that:
- Having energy infrastructure that is affordable, reliable, and resilient is of the highest importance to the economic well-being, health, and safety of the people of this State.
- The supply chain for this State’s energy infrastructure must be reliable and provide the highest likelihood of continued access.
- Currently, certain types of energy generation are disproportionately reliant on China.
- Geopolitical events, including the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, risk the reliability of supply chains running through China.
- China’s recognized use of forced labor also threatens global energy supply chains.
- In addition, batteries and power inverters used in solar panels manufactured in China have been discovered to have “rogue communication devices” installed that would allow those panels to be remotely disabled.
- Given the foregoing, it is in the best interest of the economic well-being, health, and safety of the people of this State to avoid approving new energy infrastructure projects that are reliant on companies that have been included in certain lists by the federal government, and to instead approve projects using sources that do not carry these risks.
SECTION 2. Definitions
- “Covered energy infrastructure” means a covered electrical generation or storage device used in connection with the generation of electrical power by this state, any political subdivision of this state, or a public utility subject to the jurisdiction of the [Public Service Commission].
- “Covered electrical generation or storage device” means any device or system used to convert sunlight or wind into electrical energy, or to store energy in a chemical form for conversion into electrical energy when needed, that originates from, is manufactured by, or uses one or more components from a covered entity.
- “Covered entity” means a China-based entity or an affiliate of such an entity that is identified by at least one of the following:
- the United States Department of Homeland Security pursuant to Section 2(d)(2)(B) of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act;
- the United States Department of Defense pursuant to Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021;
- the United States Department of Commerce’s Entity List;
- the United States Department of the Treasury in the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List;
- the Federal Communications Commission’s “Covered List”; 5
- Section 889 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232);6 or
- Section 5949 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) or a list created by the United States Department of Defense pursuant to this section.7
SECTION 3. Prohibition on Sourcing Energy Infrastructure from China
- It is the declared public policy of this state to avoid covered energy infrastructure so that our citizens and economy are not reliant on goods or key materials obtained from or processed by Chinese-based entities designated by the federal government as presenting a risk to U.S. national security, being affiliated with Chinese military efforts, or producing goods using forced labor, as such goods and materials are necessarily less reliable due to potential actions by the federal government.
- An agency, board, or political subdivision of this state may not approve any contract, application, permit, or request to install any new covered electrical generation or storage device as part of covered energy infrastructure in this state. An applicant must provide true and complete documents or other evidence sufficient to show that no electrical generation or storage device intended for installation constitutes a covered electrical generation or storage device.
- Any governmental action approving the procurement, construction or recovery of costs in violation of this Act is void. The [attorney general] may investigate possible violations of this Act according to the investigative authority in [state UDAP law], and may file an action for declaratory and injunctive relief for any violation of this Act.
SECTION 4. Severability
SECTION 5. Applicability and Effective Date
1 https://www.dhs.gov/uflpa-entity-list.
2 https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4023145/dod-releases-list-of-chinese-military-companies-in-accordance-with-section-1260/.
3 https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/fsj_faqs/faq/106-where-can-i-find-the-entity-list.
4 https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/chinese-military-companies-sanctions
5 https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist
6 https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ232/PLAW-115publ232.pdf, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/14/2020-15293/federal-acquisition-regulation-prohibition-on-contracting-with-entities-using-certain
7 https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ263/PLAW-117publ263.pdf
